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THE NAMIBIAN CONFLICT: A DISCUSSION OF THE JUS AD
BELLUM AND THE JUS IN BELLO*
EDWARD KWAKWA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the United Nations' termination of South Africa's man-
date over Namibia," the South African army maintains a significant
presence in the territory.' In turn, the South West African People's
Organization ("SWAPO") has been engaged in a struggle against South
African occupation of Namibia. Recent reports indicate that fervent
attempts are being made to end this ongoing struggle,' but there still
remain serious doubts about the prospect for peace in the region." The
* Several significant developments pertaining to the Namibian conflict have taken
place within the past few months. In the most important of these, South Africa, Angola
and Cuba signed an agreement under which, inter alia, South Africa agreed to a troop
pull-out of Namibia. For a discussion of some of the problems envisaged in this troop
pull-out, see N.Y. Times, March 1, 1989, at A3, col. 4. For the most recent developments
pertaining to the conflict, see generally Documents on Peace in Southwestern Africa and
Transition for Namibian Independence, July 20, 1988 - May 19, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 944-
1017. Nevertheless, this Article remains relevant for several reasons. It is not unlikely
that the South African withdrawal will be completed in the very near future. The law of
armed conflict will continue to be applicable to the conduct of the parties even during
the withdrawal and the implementation phase of Namibia's independence. This Article's
discussion of the applicable law in the Namibian conflict also has direct relevance and
applicability to similar ongoing situations of armed conflict. It is the author's fervent
hope, however, that Namibia will have gained full independence by the time this Article
is published.
** LL.B. (Honors) 1984, University of Ghana; LL.M. 1986, Queen's University, Can-
ada; LL.M. 1987, J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School. The author wishes to thank Profes-
sors Michael Reisman and Paul Kahn for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.
1. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
2. Theoretically, there is a Military Council in Namibia that is independent of South
Africa. In practice, however, this Military Council operates under the effective control of
the Southern African Defence Force (the "SADF"). See 14 AF& CoNTEMP. REC. B668
(1981-82). South Africa currently maintains approximately 100,000 armed men in
Namibia. By conservative estimate, this works out to one armed man for every thirteen
or fourteen civilians in Namibia. See Russell, Fire Next Door in AFRICA, Oct. 1986, at 29.
3. See, e.g., Cody, "Peace Steps" Agreed for Angola, Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1988,
at A13, col. 4; Thurow, Governments Agree on Wide Principles in Southern Africa, Wall
St. J., July 21, 1988, at 12, col. 4; Ottaway, Cautious Optimism on Southern Africa,
Washington Post, July 15, 1988, at A16, col. 3.
4. See, e.g., Uogh, Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices, reprinted in 6 FOREIGN
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
conflict in Namibia is not likely to come to an end even within the next
year. In the interim, however, it is imperative that discussion should
not be diverted from the conduct of the war itself. Until such time as
the Namibian conflict is brought to an end, it is important to focus on
the law and policy issues involved in the conflict. Characterization of
the governing norms is necessary in determining the treatment which
should be accorded to captured SWAPO guerrillas and South African
forces. It is also important in assessing the entitlement of all parties to
the conflict, on the field of battle as well as upon capture.
This Article analyzes the governing norms of international law re-
lating to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello5 in the Namibian con-
flict. The first part of this analysis sets forth the Namibian conflict in
historical perspective, followed by a discussion of claims relating to the
jus ad bellum. The argument presented, inter alia, is that SWAPO is
engaged in a legitimate war of national liberation because: 1) South
Africa is illegally occupying Namibia; 2) South Africa's rule by
apartheid in Namibia constitutes a violation of international norms; 3)
SWAPO is regarded by the international community as the legitimate
representative of the Namibian people; 4) present trends in world so-
cial process indicate a high degree of tolerance by the international
community for the activities of liberation groups such as SWAPO
which are engaged in a struggle for self-determination; and 5) the pre-
sent state of international relations suggests the legitimacy of the use
of force in pursuit of basic human dignity. This author takes the posi-
tion that in the peculiar context of the Namibian conflict, the right of
self-determination has become preeminent because it is not at variance
with the norms of international law.
The second part of this Article discusses the law that should be
applied in the Namibian conflict. It argues that the conflict in Namibia
is an international, rather than an internal, armed conflict, because: 1)
South Africa's presence in Namibia amounts to a foreign occupation; 2)
"Liberation" groups such as SWAPO engaged in resisting the suppres-
sion of their right to self-determination are engaged in an international
AFF. 1067, 1089 (1988) (arguing that the South Africans are unlikely to implement UN
Resolution 435 to bring about Namibian independence because, "Namibia is far more
important militarily to Pretoria now than it was in 1980-1981"); Battersby, Amid
Namibia's White Opulence,Majority Rule Isn't So Scary Now, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,
1988, at Al, col. 1 (Militant black trade unionists criticized some guerilla leaders for
cooperating with the peace plan and preparing for a new battle on the question of sover-
eignty over Walvis Bay, a South African enclave that was never a part of Namibia).
5. "Jus ad bellum" is used here to refer to the law that determines the existence of a




conflict, having regard to the nature and degree of third-party involve-
ment and assistance from the international community; and 3) United
Nations prescriptions overwhelmingly establish the international na-
ture of the conflict. It is suggested that although Namibia is not an
independent state stricto sensu, international recognition has con-
ferred a kind of quasi-statehood, thus granting it the status of a
"Power" in conflict within the purview of Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.6
This Article also analyzes the Namibian conflict in the context of
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I,' and concludes that although Ar-
ticle 1(4) was specifically created to address situations such as that of
Namibia, its limited practice by the international community is insuffi-
cient to infer that it has attained the status of custom. Consequently,
Article 1(4) is not directly applicable in the Namibian conflict. The
conduct of the parties to the conflict is therefore governed by the 1949
Geneva Conventions in their entirety, as well as those provisions of
Additional Protocol I which are declaratory of custom and the general
principles and customs of the law of war. The Article argues that, con-
sistent with the Geneva Conventions and provisions of Additional Pro-
tocol I, SWAPO guerrillas are entitled to combatant and prisoner of
war ("POW") status upon capture by the South African government.
SWAPO is similarly under a corresponding obligation to observe the
laws of war in their entirety.
This Article is premised on the assumption that a result-oriented
approach should be taken in construing international humanitarian law
instruments. Such a methodology accords with the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties,8 and best advances the interests of interna-
tional humanitarian law.
6. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions of 1949].
7. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I. L. M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter
Protocol I].
8. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.").
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Namibia is a huge region of land covering a quarter of a million
square miles.9 Its population was estimated at about 1.2 million in
1986.1 Namibia possesses scattered deposits of valuable minerals in-
cluding lead, zinc, copper, iron, vanadium, gold and silver," and it
ranks third in the world" among the producers of gem diamonds. In
short, Namibia is one of the most richly endowed territories on the
African continent.
At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, South African
troops occupied South-West Africa, which had been declared a colony
by Germany in 1884.'3 After institution of the League of Nations man-
date system in 1920, the Union of South Africa was given the mandate
over South-West Africa, and was permitted to administer it as an inte-
gral part of South Africa, with the proviso that it administer in the
interests of the indigenous population."' After the Second World War,
the League of Nations was superseded by the United Nations, and the
mandate system was superseded by the trusteeship system. 5 South Af-
rica, however, refused to submit a trusteeship agreement for South-
West Africa, arguing that the mandate had expired with the demise of
the League, and that South Africa's sovereignty over South-West Af-
rica was therefore unrestricted.'
In 1950, the International Court of Justice (the "Court") held that
although South Africa had no competence to unilaterally modify the
international legal status of South-West Africa, it was not legally
obliged to place the territory under trusteeship. 17 In 1966, the Court
refused to deal with substantive accusations made against South Af-
9. This region is larger than Great Britain, West Germany and Italy combined. See P.
DUIGNAN & L. GANN, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA - NAMIBIA (1978).
10. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 721 (10th ed. 1988) [hereinafter AFRICA].
11. Id.
12. South Africa and the USSR are the leading producers. See id.
13. The historical account given below is extracted in large part from AFRICA, supra
note 10, at 722. For a detailed account of the historical development of the dispute over
Namibia, see generally, I. SAGAY, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE (1975);
I. DORE, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA (1985); G. COCKRAM, SOUTH-
WEST AFRICAN MANDATE (1976); A. OBOZUWA, THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION: LEGAL AND PO-
LITICAL ASPECTS (1973); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 536 (1980) [hereinafter McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN].
14. See AFRICA, supra note 10, at 722.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, discussed in T. ELIAS,




rica's administration of Namibia, on grounds of a lack of locus standi
on the part of the two African countries (Ethiopia and Liberia) that
had invoked the Court's compulsory jurisdiction."8
This decision of the Court received immediate negative re-
sponses.19 The United Nations General Assembly resolved to terminate
South African trusteeship, and consequently gave responsibility for ad-
ministration of the territory to a United Nations Council for
Namibia2 0 In 1971, the Court finally gave an opinion which was
favorable to Namibia.2 1 The Court held:
1. [The] continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being
illegal, South Africa [was] under obligation to withdraw its
administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an
end to its occupation of the Territory;
2. [Member States] of the UN [were] under obligation to rec-
ognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia
and the invalidity of its [actions] on behalf of or concern-
ing Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular
any dealings with the government of South Africa implying
recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assis-
tance to, such presence and administration; and
3. It [was] incumbent upon [non-Member] States of the UN
to give assistance ... in the action[s] ... taken by the UN
with regard to Namibia.22
SWAPO was founded in 196023 with the stated objective of liberat-
ing the Namibian people "from colonial oppression and exploitation." '24
18. South-West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of July 18, 1966).
19. For a discussion and critique of the Court's position, see generally, T. ELIAS,
supra note 17, at 347, nn. 7-9 and accompanying text.
20. By Resolution 2145 (XXI) of Oct. 27, 1966, the General Assembly placed
Namibia under the direct responsibility of the UN in order to enable Namibians exercise
their right of self-determination. It also established the UN Council for Namibia (by
Resolution 2248 (s-v) of May 19, 1967) with the objective, inter alia, of obtaining the
withdrawal of the South African regime from Namibia. See Report of the United Na-
tions Council for Namibia, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 24), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/38/24 (1984)
[hereinafter Report of the UN Council for Namibia (1984)].
21. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter Namibia case].
22. Id. at 58, para. 133.
23. See REVOLUTIONARY AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS 243 (H. Degenhardt ed. 1988)
[hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS).
24. To BE BORN A NATION: THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE FOR NAMIBIA 176 (Dept. of
Info. & Publicity SWAPO, 1981). According to SWAPO's constitution, the two major
tasks facing the Organization are:
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Although SWAPO's outlook was predominantly political at its incep-
tion, its leaders subsequently decided that political and military efforts
in pursuit of national liberation could be used concurrently, because
the two were complementary, and not contradictory."' Accordingly,
SWAPO launched a guerrilla struggle against South Africa in 1966.26
Today, the struggle is carried out on two fronts. The "internal wing" of
SWAPO is based largely in Namibia, and carries out mainly political
propaganda activities.27 The "external wing," on the other hand, is
based outside of Namibia, and comprises, inter alia, the armed wing of
SWAPO.2 8 The external wing of SWAPO launches its raids into
Namibia (against the South African army) from neighboring countries
such as Angola and, to a lesser extent, Zambia.2 9 Thus, for all intents
and purposes, SWAPO is engaged in an armed conflict against South
Africa. Although the facts and the legal issues implicated in the
Namibian conflict are complex, 0 this Article discusses only those per-
taining to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
1. The liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia by all
possible means and the establishment of a democratic people's government;
and
2. The realization of genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres
of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs.
See REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTs, supra note 23, at 257.
25. Id. at 176; see also infra note 26. SWAPO justified its resort to armed force on
grounds of self-defense.
26. It was not until 1971, however, that South Africa sent its army into Namibia.
Legum, The Southern African Crisis - Darkness at the End of the Tunnel, 14 AFR.
CONTEMP. REC. A4 (1981-82).
27. Interview with SWAPO activist, Washington, D.C. (Summer 1988).
28. The military wing of SWAPO was re-organized in 1973 and renamed the People's
Liberation Army of Namibia ("PLAN"). SWAPO has maintained in the past that most
of its attacks on the South African forces have been conducted from within Namibia
itself. But see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. The war is carried out mainly in the Ovamboland region, where nearly 40% of the
Namibian population lives. Legum, supra note 26, at A4.
30. The issues are further complicated by SWAPO's lack of status as a government in
power, and by the existence of the UN Council for Namibia. The Council was set up as
the Legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence. As a major policy-
making organ of the UN, the Council largely undertakes activities with a view to mobiliz-
ing concerted international action to seek an end to South Africa's occupation of
Namibia. The Council has "continuously and resolutely supported the Namibian people
in their just struggle under the leadership of SWAPO." See Report of the UN Council
for Namibia (1984), supra note 20, at 1.
In essence, SWAPO and the UN Council for Namibia have similar goals, although
they are resorting to entirely different methods in pursuit of these goals. For purposes of
the discussion here, however, this difference in approach is of no direct relevance. Dis-




III. CLAIMS RELATING To THE Jus AD BELLUM
A. The Illegal Occupation of Namibia by South Africa is an Act of
Aggression against the Namibian People
The dispute over the continued control of Namibia by South Af-
rica has been a regular feature on the agenda of the United Nations
since its inception."' As far back as 1966, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution declaring:
The Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be ex-
ercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other
right to administer the Territory, and that henceforth South
West Africa [Namibia] comes under the direct responsibility of
the United Nations.3
2
The Security Council also declared, in 1969, that "the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and contrary to the prin-
ciples of the Charter and the previous decisions of the United Nations
and is detrimental to the interests of the population of the territory
and those of the international community.""3 South Africa has consist-
ently ignored repeated resolutions 4 of the Council, despite United Na-
tions Charter Article 25 which states that members of the United Na-
tions agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the Charter.
3 5
South Africa's occupation of Namibia has also been described as
"somewhat in the nature of usurpation and an occupation mala fide."'
International opinion indicates that South Africa's armed occupation
of Namibia is considered tantamount to an act of aggression. A United
States representative stated: "The territory [i.e., Namibia] is occupied
by force against the will of the international authority entitled to ad-
minister it. Such occupation is as much belligerent occupation as the
0
31. The number of resolutions adopted on issues pertaining to decolonization has sig-
nificantly decreased in the past three decades, due to the attainment of independence by
a large number of nations. The question of Namibia, however, has been the subject of
more resolutions than all other past decolonization issues combined. See Marin-Bosch,
How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 41 INT'L ORG.. 705-
06 (1987).
32. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
33. S.C. Res. 264, 24 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1. (1969).
34. See e.g., S.C. Res. 385, 31 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31 (1976); S.C. Res. 435,
33 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1978); S.C. Res. 532, 38 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/38 (1983).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
36. See Namibia case, supra note 21, at 218.
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hostile occupation of the territory of another state. '3 7 The occurrence
of an act of aggression" gives rise to an authorization for a military
response and the right to involvement by third-party states through
collective self-defense. 39 There has, therefore, evolved in African State
practice the theory that groups like SWAPO are entitled to a right of
"self-defense against permanent aggression." ''"
According to this theory, the OAU 4 ' can resort to collective self-
37. This statement was included in the text of a written submission to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice by the United States in the Namibia case. It was on the basis of
this United States submission that the Vice-President of the Court concluded that South
Africa's presence in Namibia is an act of aggression. See Namibia case, supra note 21, at
89.
38. For a discussion on the concept of an act of aggression, see generally J. STONE,
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958). On the concept of aggression as applied to the
southern African region, see Higginbotham, International Law, the Use of Force in Self-
Defense, and the Southern African Conflict, 25 COLUM. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1987).
39. Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua
v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 21
(1987). The Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, in the Namibia case,
relied extensively on the concept of self-defense in justifying the struggle being waged by
SWAPO:
In law, the legitimacy of the people's struggle cannot be in any doubt, for it
follows from the right of self-defense, inherent in human nature, which is con-
firmed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is also an accepted principle that self-
defense may be collective; thus we see the other peoples of Africa, members of
the Organization of African Unity, associated with the Namibians in their fight
for freedom ... the struggle of the Namibian people thus takes its place within
the framework of international law, not least because the struggle of peoples in
general has been one, if not indeed the primary factor in the formation of the
customary rule whereby the right of peoples to self-determination is recognized.
Namibia case, supra note 21, at 70 (Vice-President Ammoun).
40. SWAPO has justified its liberation struggle in Namibia on grounds of self-defense
in the following manner: "In law, the legitimacy of our struggle for national liberation
cannot be in doubt, for it follows from the natural right of self-defense, inherent in
human nature, which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." State-
ment by SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, Dakar International Conference 1976:
Namibia and Human Rights, reprinted in 9 HUM. RTs. J. 225 (1976).
The concept of self-defense against a continuing aggression was given prominence
when India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961. India justified its use of force
against Goa on the grounds that Portugal's presence in Goa constituted an aggression
that had been going on for 450 years. India was therefore entitled to retaliate in self-
defense. See 16 U.N. SCOR (987th mtg.) at para. 46, U.N. Doc. S/PV.987 (1961). The
Indian action was neither sanctioned nor condemned by the Security Council. Id. at pa-
ras. 128-29.
41. The Organization of African Unity (the "OAU") is an Organization formed pursu-
ant to the Charter of the Organization of the African Unity, signed at Addis Adaba, on
May 25, 1963. Its members include the Continental African States, Madagascar and
other islands surrounding Africa. Its purposes are to promote the unity and solidarity of
the African States; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a
[Vol. 9
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defense on behalf of Namibia. This Article argues below that although
South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia, the struggle of the
Namibian people cannot be equated with self-defense under Article 51
of the United Nations Charter.4
B. The OAU and The Use of Force - The Traditional Inherent
Right of Self-Defense in the African Context
The preamble to the OAU Charter specifies that the African
States believe in the inalienable right of all people to control their own
destiny.48 One of the basic aims of the Organization is "to eradicate all
forms of colonialism from Africa."' The OAU thus demands of its
members an "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the Afri-
can territories which are still dependent."'
In conformity with the OAU Charter, the African States claim that
the use of armed force is justified to end colonialism and to implement
the principle of self-determination, provided that result is not achieva-
ble by peaceful means." In the context of the Namibian conflict, how-
better life for the African peoples; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity
and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote in-
ternational co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See OAU CHARTER arts. 1(1), 2(1)(a)-(e), reprinted in 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (1964).
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 7.
43. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 41, preamble.
44. See id. art. 2(1)(d).
45. Id. art. 3(6). For a justification for the inclusion of these anti-colonialist senti-
ments in the OAU Charter, see generally R. AKINDELE, THE ORGANIZATION AND PROMO-
TION OF WORLD PEACE: A STUDY OF UNIVERSAL-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 121 (1976).
46. The argument was put before the Legal Committee of the General Assembly as
follows:
[Tihe [UN] Charter itself contemplated the lawful use of force in certain cir-
cumstances. One of these circumstances was individual or collective action in the
exercise of the right of self-defense. The Addis Ababa Conference had simply
exercised that right by providing for collective action to assist national
liberation.
18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (805th mtg.) at para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 805 (1963). A more
forceful variant of this argument was also put before the Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression. See Statement by Representative of Guinea, Report of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. AC-91/SR.15 at 7 (1965).
The Representative's argument is as follows:
The colonial system was the most flagrant act of aggression which could be per-
petrated; thus Africa, throughout much of its territory, was ... suffering acts of
undoubted aggression, for which the colonialist Powers were responsible. All
other forms of colonization - neo-colonialism, imperialism or economic colonial-
ism - fell within that category of direct aggression.
Id. For a critique of this position, see generally Dugard, The Organization of African
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ever, this argument is not tenable. Colonialism and racist domination,
per se, do not involve an "armed attack" on subjected peoples.47 Nor
does the related argument of colonialism as permanent aggression jus-
tify a right of self-defense against racial and colonial domination. The
claim that the OAU can collectively resort to self-defense against
South Africa immediately brings into play the requirements of Article
51 of the United Nations Charter.4s But the OAU Charter, unlike other
regional treaties such as that of the OAS," does not expressly provide
for collective self-defense. There is no provision in the OAU Charter
providing that an armed attack against any member State shall be con-
sidered as an attack on all member States.50 Furthermore, Article 54 of
the United Nations Charter provides that "[tihe Security Council shall
at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in con-
templation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the
maintenance of international peace and security."'" In conformity with
this provision, the OAU would have to give the Security Council prior
notice of its intention to forcefully intervene in Namibia.52
Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defense as a Justification for
the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 157 (1967).
47. Kwakwa, South Africa's May, 1986 Military Incursions into Neighboring African
States, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 437 (1987).
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 7. It may be argued that Article 51 only gives the
right of self-defense until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security, and that measures taken by the OAU, in any
case, shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Coun-
cil under the present Charter to take at any time such measures as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. In effect, the argument
would be that the Security Council is currently seized of jurisdiction on the Namibian
conflict, thus ousting the OAU or any other country's competence.
49. OAS CHARTER art. 24, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
50. In 1968, however, the OAU Council of Ministers Resolution CM/154 (XI) de-
clared that "any aggression on any OAU Member State by the colonialist and fascist
regimes of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia is regarded as an aggression on all Mem-
bers of the OAU." For a further discussion on this issue, see Andemicael, The OAU and
the UN - Relation in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 225 (B. Andemicael ed. 1979). Although Namibia has been recognized by the
OAU, it is technically not a "Member State" of the OAU.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 54 (emphasis added).
52. There is precedent to suggest that prior notice is not required under Article 54 of
the UN Charter. In 1965, an American, and later an Inter-American peace force, was
sent into the Dominican Republic to restore and maintain order. For an informative
background on the political situation in the Dominican Republic during the months pre-
ceding United States intervention, see R. BARNETT, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION 153
(1968). When the matter came before the Security Council, the United States argued
that the landing of American troops was consistent with Article 52 of the UN Charter
whereby a regional agency is permitted to deal with its own matters relating to the main-
tenance of international peace and security. Thus, American and Inter-American forces
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South Africa's occupation of Namibia does not amount to an
armed attack giving the people of Namibia the right of self-defense.
Semble, neither Article 51 nor Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter readily provide the OAU with a legal justification for forcefully
intervening in Namibia against South Africa.5 3
C. South Africa's Rule by Apartheid In Namibia Constitutes a
Violation of International Norms
South Africa's imposition of apartheid in Namibia began in 1964.
5 4
Proclamation AG8 was introduced in April 1980, with a view to divid-
ing Namibia into eleven mutually exclusive groups on the basis of ra-
cial, ethnic and tribal origins." The South African government openly
admits and justifies the institutionalization of apartheid in Namibia. In
its counter-memorial in the South-West Africa case, for example, it
stated:
Having regard to the specific problem of the future of South
West Africa and its peoples . . . [riespondent can by way of
solution see no alternative to an approach involving similar
objectives and principles to those of the South African... pol-
icy of separate development."
The policy of apartheid has, therefore, been institutionalized in
Namibia.
5 7
were not engaging in an enforcement action under Article 51 which would require ap-
proval by the Security Council. See 21 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 2) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6302
(1965); see also Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis : Im-
pact on World Order, 44 DEN. L. J. 225 (1967).
During the Cuban Crisis, the United States also took the position that prior authori-
zation was not required under Article 53 of the UN Charter. See Meeker, Defensive
Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT. L. 515, 520 (1963) ("[I]t should not be assumed
that 'authorization of the Security Council' automatically and necessarily means prior
authorization ... the Council could appropriately give its authorization after the fact");
cf. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 559 (1963) (arguing that prior
authorization was a prerequisite for regional action, and that it was only under Article 51
that prior authorization was not required).
53. It is, however, suggested that a more plausible argument for OAU intervention in
Namibia can be found in the concept of humanitarian intervention. See infra note 224.
54. See Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 24) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/40/24 (1985) [hereinafter Report of the UN Council for
Namibia (1985)].
55. Id.
56. 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings 472.
57. Further evidence of this institutionalization lies in the fact that four successive
South African Ministers from 1948 to 1970 defined their concept of the apartheid policy
as applicable in both South Africa and Namibia. See Namibia case, supra note 21, at 81-
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South Africa's policy of apartheid has been the topic of prolonged
debates and more General Assembly resolutions than any other single
item ever to appear on the Assembly's agenda.5 There has been a vir-
tual deluge of United Nations resolutions and decisions giving authori-
tative interpretations of the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other related human rights prescrip-
tions, all characterizing apartheid as unlawful under international
law.5 9 It has been referred to as "a comprehensive and systematic pat-
tern of racial discrimination ... compris[ing] a complex set of practices
of domination and subjection, intensely hierarchized and sustained by
the whole apparatus of the state, which affects the distribution of all
values."60 Apartheid has variously been described as "a threat to inter-
national peace and security,"'" "a crime against humanity, 6 2 a viola-
tion of the United Nations Charter, 3 and "a crime against the con-
science and dignity of mankind." ' Apartheid arguably also falls within
the definition of genocide6 5 incorporated in the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.6 Above all,
82 (sep. op. Judge Ammoun).
58. See Matin-Bosch, supra note 31, at 706-07.
59. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 13, at 532-33; see also Report of
the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 39 GAOR Supp. (No. 22), U.N. Doc. A/39/22
(1984) [hereinafter Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid].
60. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 13, at 521-23.
61. See, e.g., The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A.
Res. 3151, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 33, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2923,
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 39/72, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1985). The OAU has similarly held that
"[the] racist terrorist South Africa's ... policy of apartheid constitutes a serious threat
to international peace and security." See Nairobi Resolution of the 37th Ordinary Ses-
sion of the OAU Council of Ministers, O.A.U. CM/Res. 854 (XXXVII), reprinted in 14
AFR. CONTEMP. REC. C5 (1981-82).
62. See, e.g., The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South
Africa, G.A. Res. 2202, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
G.A. Res. 3324, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 38, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
63. Namibia case, supra note 21, at 57.
64. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
65. On South Africa's campaign of terror in Namibia through the constant harass-
ment, detention, torture and cold-blooded murder of innocent civilians and other inhu-
man practices, see Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (1985), supra note
54, at 3, 45; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNuAL REPORTS 62 (1982).
66. Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S.
No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The question of whether or not South Africa is a signatory to
the Convention is moot, because the relevant provisions of the Convention have become
customary international law. The International Court of Justice indicated in an advisory
opinion that the prohibition on genocide is regarded as jus cogens. See Reservations to
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apartheid contradicts the fundamental premise of the United Nations
Charter that governments should treat all persons as equals before the
law."" The contention that the practice of racial discrimination is a vio-
lation of a norm of international law can hardly be denied. 8
D. South Africa is Guilty of Aggression Against Neighboring
African States
International law prohibits states from allowing the use of their
territory as bases from which illegal acts are carried out against other
states. This principle was expressed in Article 4 of the International
Law Commission's 1949 Draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
States,"' and in wider terms in the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.7 0 This
dictate would seem to suggest, prima facie, that African states such as
Angola which allow SWAPO guerrillas to use their territory for incur-
sions into Namibia are engaged in impermissible interventionist activ-
ity. The rules on non-intervention have, however, through the activities
of the United Nations and the general practice of states, undergone
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J.
15, 23-24; see also Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Cen-
tury, 159 HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 64-67 (1978). For a categorization of the various laws and
activities of the South African government that establish its acts as genocide, see Report
of The Special Committee Against Apartheid, supra note 59, at 54-56; see also Kiapi,
The Status of Apartheid in International Law, 17 IND. J. INT'L L. 57-58 (1977).
67. Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 584.
68. The norm prohibiting the practice of racial discrimination has in fact been char-
acterized as a rule of jus cogens. See I. SAGAY, supra note 13, at 144; see also, Namibia
case, supra note 21, at 57, para. 131 ("To establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of ... national or
ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant viola-
tion of the purposes and principles of the Charter"); South-West Africa case, 1966 I.C.J.
4, 293 (dissenting op. of Judge Tanaka, arguing that the "norm of non-discrimination...
on the basis of race has become a rule of customary international law.").
The question of human rights violations has been removed from the domain reserve
of sovereign states, and the welfare of the individual is now treated by the international
community as a matter of international concern. See Weston, Human Rights, 6 HUM.
RTS. Q. 257 (1984). Thus, the question of human rights is not a domestic matter that falls
outside the jurisdictional competence of the international community.
69. Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4, re-
printed in part in [1949) 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 93-97.
70. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
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substantial modification.7' The Declaration on Friendly Relations 7
and the Definition of Aggression Resolution 73 suggest that supporting
armed liberation movements does not constitute aggression.7 4 The
practice of States is pointing towards an emerging consensus that the
use of armed force in support of liberation movements is legal.75
From the above, it would appear that it is legitimate for Angola
and other countries to support the SWAPO fighters. Assuming, with-
out necessarily deciding, that such support is an act of intervention
against South Africa, such intervention would not amount to an armed
attack granting South Africa the right of self-defense under Article
51.76 The International Court of Justice addressed the issue of armed
attack in the Nicaragua case. 77 It stressed that "the Court does not
believe that the concept of 'armed attack' includes not only acts by
armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assis-
tance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or
other support. 7' The Court went on to hold: "While the concept of an
armed attack includes the despatch by one State of armed bands into
the territory of another State, the supply of arms and other support to
such bands cannot be equated with armed attack." '79
71. See Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Rights in the Developing Coun-
tries, 60 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 129, 132 (1966).
72. See supra note 70.
73. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Article 7 of this resolution provides:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice
the right . . . of peoples[,] . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist
regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned
Declaration.
Id.
74. For a more extensive discussion, see Kwakwa, supra note 47, at 437-38.
75. Even the Western States' traditional hostility to the idea of legitimizing the pro-
vision of support to liberation movements has crumbled. President Reagan, for example,
has openly declared that "[s]upport for freedom fighters is... totally consistent with the
OAS and UN Charters." 31 KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIvES 33, 454 (1985).
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
77. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 1 [hereinafter Nicaragua Merits case].
78. Id. at 103, para. 195.
79. Id. at 126, para. 247; cf. dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 331-48, pa-
ras. 154-173 (arguing that support for insurgents violates Article 2(4) and, accordingly,
permits a violent response in self-defense). The International Court of Justice's decision
was not accepted by the United States. For general commentaries on the Nicaragua case
and the implications of the United States' decision to withdraw from the Court, see gen-
erally Maier, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81
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The Court's holding is consistent with recent State practice. The
Contra rebels are known to have bases in Honduras, from which they
launch raids into Nicaragua against the Sandista government."0 When
the Sandinista forces crossed into Honduras in pursuit of the Contras,
however, it was widely perceived by the international community as an
armed attack against the territorial integrity of Honduras."1 In effect,
it is widely felt that the presence of Contra bases in Honduras does not
amount to an armed attack on Nicaragua.8 2 Similarly, the presence of
SWAPO guerrillas in Angola or Zambia should not be equated with an
armed attack by those countries against the South African
government. 8
E. Swapo is Engaged in a Legitimate Struggle for Self-
Determination
As a matter of state practice, the international community has re-
cently manifested a high degree of tolerance for the activities of recog-
nized national liberation movements, particularly in their fight for
freedom and self-determination. 4 The Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions,8 5 an "ambitious codification of contemporary international law
[that] has been widely accepted,"88 states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development, and every State has
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter."
AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987); Kahn, supra note 39.
80. Anderson, The Contras Under The Gun, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1988, at 36.
81. Id.
82. Id; see also Nicaragua: Whose Trump?, EcONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1988, at 34.
83. Utilization of Namibia as a springboard for armed attacks and destabilization of
neighboring countries has been repeatedly condemned by the Security Council. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 577, 40 SCOR at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF./40 (1985); see also Kahn, supra note 39,
at 21 ("To find an armed attack is to find authorization for a military response ...
Packed into a determination that an armed attack has occurred are many of the most
important functions of an international legal order. It is not a determination that should
be made lightly.").
84. See generally Kwakwa, supra note 47.
85. See supra note 70.
86. Reisman, The Resistance in Afghanistan is Engaged in a War of National Liber-
ation, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 906, 908 (1987).
87. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70, at 123.
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The Declaration recognizes the legitimacy of the actions taken by
oppressed peoples in the pursuit of self-determination and calls upon
member states to contribute moral and material assistance to such
movements."' It provides that
[i]n their actions against, and resistance to... forcible action
in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination..
.[,] peoples [under colonial and racist regimes or other alien
forms of domination] are entitled to seek and to receive sup-
port in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter.8 9
Indeed, Judge Ammoun demonstrated in the Namibia case that the
international community as a whole deems it legitimate to defend
human rights by force of arms. 0 He went so far as to state that resort
to force in pursuit of self-determination has become a custom within
the ambit of Article 38 (1)(b) of the International Court of Justice stat-
ute.9' SWAPO is, in effect, the military arm of a people engaged in a
war of national liberation,"2 and the following "coordinate international
rights and obligations"9 3 exist in the Namibian conflict:
1. SWAPO is entitled to wage a war of liberation against
South Africa's occupation94 army in Namibia.
2. SWAPO is entitled to receive third-party assistance in its
war with South Africa.
3. South Africa is under an obligation not to suppress
SWAPO's fight for self-determination.
4. Third[-party] states do not incur any international respon-
sibility in granting moral and material assistance to
88. See id. at 124.
89. Id. The effect of this declaration is that "the forcible denial of self-determination
constitutes a violation of the Charter which justifies circumscribing the neutrality of the
other member States, without engaging their international responsibility vis-a-vis that
government." Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols, 165 (IV) RECUEIL DES CoURs 353, 373 (1979). Pursuant to these resolutions
and declarations, the OAU has called upon member-states to contribute material assis-
tance to SWAPO. For a critique of the OAU position, see Dugard, supra note 46.
90. See Namibia case, supra note 21, at 16.
91. Id. at 112 ("If there is any "general practice" which might be held, beyond dis-
pute, to constitute law within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1(b) of the Statute of
the Court, it must surely be that which is made up of the conscious action of the peoples
themselves, engaged in a determined struggle.").
92. On recognition of SWAPO as the "true and legitimate representative" of the
Namibian people, see infra note 133.
93. Reisman, supra note 86, at 909.
94. On the concept of occupation, see notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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SWAPO in the Namibian conflict.
5. Third[-party] states are under obligation not to assist
South Africa in its suppression of SWAPO's fight for self-
determination."5
The Namibian conflict presents a unique but clear case of the right to
use force. The resort to force in pursuit of self-determination in
Namibia does not conflict with any other traditional norm of interna-
tional law. SWAPO is not seeking to secede from Namibia, it is fight-
ing to uphold Namibia's territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence. SWAPO is not seeking the overthrow of a legitimately installed
government, it is seeking to remove a government that has been de-
clared by the international community, without exception, to be in ille-
gal occupation of Namibia. SWAPO's struggle in Namibia is consistent
with the United Nations and OAU Charters, the "Lusaka Manifesto,""6
and general international law norms.
IV. CLAIMS RELATING To THE Jus IN BELLO
The law of war distinguishes between international armed con-
flicts,9" on the one hand, and non-international armed conflicts, 9 on
95. Reisman, supra note 86, at 909. Apart from being one of the holdings in the
Namibia case, it has also been established in state practice that a state may commit a
wrongful act by executing a political act that promotes the wrongful act of another state.
This concept of "complicity liability" arises where a state facilitates the commission by
another state of an internationally wrongful act. See Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 243, U.N. Doc.
A/33.10 (1978). For an excellent discussion of complicity liability in related areas of state
practice, see generally Quigley, Complicity in International Law : A New Direction in
the Law of State Responsibility, 57 BaIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 77 (1986).
96. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa was drawn at the Fifth Summit Con-
ference of East and Central African States held in Lusaka in 1969. It has been endorsed
by the OAU and the UN. See G.A. Res. 2505, 24 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969). Paragraph 20 of the Manifesto indicates that humanitarian interven-
tion is "a responsibility to take action in defense of humanity." For the text of the Mani-
festo, see 24 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 106) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/7754 (1969).
97. Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, inter-
national armed conflicts or any other armed conflict that may arise between two or more
of the contracting parties, are all cases of declared war even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them. Likewise, partial or total occupation of the territory of a
contracting party is considered a case of declared war, even if such occupation meets no
armed resistance. Id. Article 1(4) of Protocol I extends this definition of international
armed conflicts to include wars traditionally referred to as wars of liberation. See Proto-
col I, supra note 7; see also infra text accompanying notes 146-77.
98. Non-international armed conflicts are:
[A]II armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and relating to the Protec-
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the other." This distinction is significant. These two types of conflict
are governed by significantly different legal regimes.1"' An objective
characterization of the conflict in Namibia is therefore necessary in or-
der to determine the applicable norms governing the conflict. 10 1
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups'which, under responsi-
ble command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.
Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [herein-
after Protocol II]. Excluded from the category of non-international armed conflicts, are
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. Id. art. 1(2).
Protocol II "develops and supplements" Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. It will be argued that although these legal regimes were meant to deal with non-
international armed conflicts, they also provide minimal guarantees in international con-
flicts such as the Namibian situation.
99. Cf. K. SUTER, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW Or GUERRILLA WARFARE 149 (1984) (arguing
that the distinction between international and non-international conflicts is no longer
feasible).
100. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 purports to govern
"armed conflicts not of an international character," without defining what these conflicts
are. It simply establishes a minimum set of provisions that apply in a non-international
armed conflict occurring in the territory of one of the contracting Parties. See Geneva
Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 3. Common Article 3 has been referred
to as "a Convention in miniature." See THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
COMMENTARY IV - GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PER-
SONS IN TIME OF WAR 34 (J.S. Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter PtCTET COMMENTARY IV].
Common Article 3 provides certain important minimal guarantees - it "at least ensures
the application of the rules of humanity which are recognized as essential by civilized
nations," "provides a legal basis for charitable interventions by the ICRC," and "lays
down certain mandatory rules." Id. It is, however, far from the functional equivalent of
the legal regime applied by Common Article 2. On the relative inadequacy of Common
Article 3, see generally, Reisman & Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 454-66 (1988); Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts : Toward
the Definition of International Armed Conflict, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1971).
101. In the seminal Nicaragua Merits case, supra note 78, however, the court stated:
Because the minimum rules applicable to international and to non-international
conflicts are identical, there is no need to address the question whether [the
actions of the United States in and against Nicaragua] must be looked at in the
context of the rules which operate for the one or the other category of conflict.
Id. at para. 219.
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A. The Conflict In Namibia is an International Armed Conflict
In the absence of ratification by the United States02 and other
major military powers, the status of Protocol I still remains uncertain.
As of April 1989, only eighty-three states were parties to Protocol ."03
The Geneva Conventions, in contrast, are widely and universally
accepted. There are 165 state parties to the Conventions, including
South Africa.""4 The universal acceptance of the Conventions as trea-
ties is manifested by the fact that they are binding on more states than
the United Nations Charter.105 The International Law Commission has
observed that "some of the [rules in the Conventions] are, in the opin-
ion of the Commission, rules which impose obligations of jus
cogens."' ' Thus, even though South Africa has not signed or ratified
the Protocols, it is nevertheless bound by the Conventions107 and those
provisions of Protocol I that are customary international law.
1. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides guidelines
for determining when a conflict is international.' A discussion of
Common Article 2 is therefore important in assessing the extent to
which the Namibian conflict can be classified as. an international
armed conflict. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
102. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan on Protocol II, S. Doc.
No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) [here-
inafter Protocol II Transmittal Letter]. For a discussion on the position of the Reagan
Administration, see Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901, 912 (1986). On
the United States decision not to ratify Protocol I, see Gasser, An Appeal for Ratifica-
tion by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987).
103. 270 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, May-June 1989, at 255.
104. 8 I.C.R.C. DISSEMINATION, Dec. 1987, at 9.
105. See Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348
(1987).
106. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 10) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980). But see dissent-
ing opinion of Sir Robert Jennings in the Nicaragua Merits case, supra note 77, at 537
(expressing serious doubt whether the Geneva Conventions could be regarded as embod-
ying customary law).
107. The Conventions are binding on South Africa qua treaty law as well as custom-
ary law, both of which are listed in Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justices'
statute as sources of law. For an argument that South Africa is not bound by the Con-
ventions because it has not yet incorporated them into her domestic law, see infra note
200 and accompanying text.
108. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2.
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declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them ... The Con-
vention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupa-
tion of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the
said occupation meets with no armed resistance . . .Although
one of the Parties in conflict may not be a Party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore
be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.10'
To establish the international nature of the Namibian conflict, it is
sufficient to show that the conflict falls into any of the following cate-
gories: 1) a declared war or any other armed conflict between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them; 2) a case of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party; and 3) a situation in which a
non-contracting Power accepts and applies the provisions of the
Conventions.
a. "A Declared War or any other Armed Conflict ... "
The use of the term "war" is an anachronism. Several wars are
being fought today with high levels of intensity and destruction of
lives. ° Yet they are not labeled wars for the simple reason that there
has been no formal declaration of war. Since the First World War,
states have been unwilling to characterize conflicts as war,"' because
doing so would immediately trigger the laws of war. Some of the mis-
conceptions about the legal consequences of a declaration of war were
manifest during the Falklands crisis of 1982 when the British Prime
Minister incorrectly stated in the British Parliament that the captured
Argentinean forces were not being treated as prisoners of war because
there had been no declaration of war."'
When Lieutenant Robert Goodman of the United States Navy was
shot down and taken into custody by the Syrian Army in December
1983, President Reagan also stated erroneously: "I don't know how you
109. Id.
110. Immediate examples are the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, the Middle East,
and Southern Africa.
111. For an account of the legal consequences flowing from a declaration of war, see I.
BROWNLIE. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 25 (1963).
112. 22 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 609 (1982), discussed in P. ROWE, DEFENCE: THE
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 141 (1987).
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have a prisoner of war when there is no declared war between nations.
I don't think that makes you eligible for the Geneva Accords [sic]."'1 s
In light of the problems attached to the concept of war, greater
emphasis must be placed on the phrase "or any other armed conflict."
This implies that any use of arms between two or more Parties brings
into play the full force of Common Article 2, irrespective of the exis-
tence of a formal declaration of war." 4
There has not been a formal declaration of war in Namibia."1 5 The
existence of an ongoing armed conflict in the territory, however, cannot
be denied. Paragraph 1 of Common Article 2 talks about an armed
conflict "between two or more of the High Contracting Parties."'
' 6
Thus, at least two of the Parties in conflict in Namibia must be Parties
to the Geneva Conventions. South Africa is a Party to the Conven-
tions." ' SWAPO"O was not an entity at the time the Conventions were
drafted. Assuming, arguendo, that it were, the question would be
whether the terms "Powers" or "Parties" include non-state entities
such as SWAPO. The travaux preparatoires to the Conventions sug-
gest that the terms were meant to refer exclusively to states.'" The
113. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1983, at A22, col. 6.
114. See Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Ge-
neva Conventions and Protocols, 163 (I) RECURIL DEs Coups 121, 131 (1979); see also
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY III - GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATrVE To THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 22-23 (J.S. Pictet ed. 1960) [herein-
after PIcTET COMMENTARY III] ("There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for
the recognition of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries to the application of
the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.").
115. On July 18, 1966, the day the International Court of Justice refused to issue a
pronouncement on the legality of South Africa's mandate over Namibia, SWAPO issued
a statement from its headquarters in Tanzania, declaring that the people of Namibia
"[had] no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about [their] liberation." AFRICA, Oct.
1986, at 28. This proclamation may hardly be seen as a formal declaration of war. In any
case, South Africa has never recognized the belligerency status of SWAPO.
116. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2, para 1.
117. See INT'L RED CROSS HANDBOOK 403 (1983).
118. On the use of the term "SWAPO" interchangeably with "Namibia," see infra
notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
119. The records of the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference also support this position.
See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Draper (U.K.), VIII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS [hereinafter OFF. REcs.], CDDH/I/SR.4, at 29
(Federal Political Department Berne, 1978) ("the Geneva Conventions and the Draft
Protocols .. .had been devised for entities capable of applying them: in other words,
States"); VIII OFF. REcs., supra, CDDH/I/SR.3 (statement of Mr. Cassesse (Italy)), at 22
("In his delegation's opinion, the word "Powers" used in the third paragraph of Art. 2 of
the Conventions could only mean states and not authorities other than States.").
This position has also been reiterated in scholarly texts. See, e.g., Takemoto, The
1977 Additional Protocols and the Law of Treaties, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNA-
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first paragraph of Article 2, it would seem, is therefore not applicable
in the Namibian conflict.2 0
b. Partial or Total Occupation of the Territory of a High Contracting
Party
South Africa has refused to recognize international prescriptions
calling on it to withdraw from Namibian territory. Under the laws of
armed conflict, "whenever a State intervenes with its armed forces in
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PicrrE 249,
258 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984) [hereinafter PICTET COLLECTION]; Cassesse, Wars in National
Liberation and Humanitarian Law in PICTE'r COLLECTION, supra, at 316 (arguing that
the whole context and the wording of the various provisions of the Conventions make it
clear that when they mention "Powers" they intend it to apply to states only).
120. The contemporaneous understanding of the drafters and signers, however, is not
necessarily dispositive. Such a restricted reading of the Conventions is not warranted
and serves no useful purpose. For example, a non-state Party such as the UN certainly
must be seen as capable of becoming a "Power" in a conflict. This role is in fact dictated
by the UN Charter. Moreover, Article 31(l) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties stipulates that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. The object and purpose of the Conventions is to ensure
adequate protection for combatants as well as non-combatants, and to increase the cate-
gories of persons who are entitled to the status of POW in the event of capture. See J.
PIcTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 38 (1985).
Interpreting the word "Power" to include non-state entities like SWAPO is therefore
consistent with the object and purpose of the Conventions. See Dugard, SWAPO: The
Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in BeUo, 93 S. APR. L. J. 144, 153 (1976) ("Liberation move-
ments are not excluded from the Geneva Conventions, as the term 'Power,' which ap-
pears in those Conventions, is not necessarily limited to States.").
It is also instructive to note that "insurgents in a civil war may become a 'Power' or a
'Party' if the established government recognizes them as a belligerent party." Schindler,
supra note 95, at 130; see, Mallison & Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Com-
batants under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 39, 55 (1977) (arguing that the interpretation of "a Party to the conflict"
which is consistent with the Brussels and Hague criteria is that which makes a broad
factual reference under which the organized resistance movement, like an irregular mili-
tia or volunteer corps, may be party to the conflict). Recognition of SWAPO as a
"Power" in conflict does not automatically establish that SWAPO is also a Party to the
Geneva Conventions. It may plausibly be argued, however, that if SWAPO were to de-
posit a declaration under Article 96(3) of Protocol I, this action would establish a strong
presumption that SWAPO had at the same time become a Party to the Geneva Conven-
tions in relation to its conflict with South Africa. This presumption arises because a
State may become a Party to the Additional Protocols of 1977 only if it is, or at the same
time becomes a Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See 8 I.C.R.C. DISSEMINATION,
Dec. 1987, at 9.
Ex hypothesi, this rule should apply, mutatis mutandis, to non-state entities. On the
other hand, the customary law nature of the Conventions suggests that the issue of
whether SWAPO is a Party thereto is a moot point.
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another State, be it to alter the regime of that State or to exercise
other acts of sovereign power, this is held to be an occupation within
the meaning of Article 2(2)."' South Africa's presence in Namibia is
an alien foreign presence. 22 For all intents and purposes, the situation
can be classified as one of "total or partial occupation." ' s This inter-
pretation is consistent with evidence of a more general tendency to
think of the laws of war as a set of minimum rules to be observed in
the widest possible range of situations. According to Roberts, "one
might hazard as a fair rule of thumb that every time the armed forces
of a country are in control of foreign territory, and find themselves face
to face with the inhabitants, some or all of the provisions of the law on
occupations are applicable," 2 " and "at the heart of almost all treaty
provisions and legal writings about occupations is the image of the
armed forces of a State exercising some kind of coercive control or au-
thority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international
frontiers of their State."125 Roberts also observes that the United Na-
tions and the International Committee of the Red Cross (the "ICRC")
121. Schindler, supra note 114, at 132. This may accord with Pictet's commentary
that Article 2(2) "only refers to cases where the occupation has taken place without a
declaration of war and without hostilities, and makes provision for the entry into force
[of the code] in those particular circumstances." Reprinted in H. LEVIE, THE CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLiCT 714 (1986).
122. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 139 (Field Manual No.
27-10, July 18, 1956) ("Military occupation is a question of fact.").
123. It is generally agreed that South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia. The una-
nimity of international opinion on this issue was recently summed up by the United
States representative in the Security Council as follows:
[T]he problem of Namibia stems from the clear and simple fact that the Repub-
lic of South Africa is illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia. South Africa
has no right to be in Namibia, no right to control the internal and external poli-
cies of that country, and no right to use it as a staging area form which to violate
the borders of neighboring States.
Statement by Ms. Byrne, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.59
(1987). The decision whether to describe the occupation as partial or total will have to be
based on an assessment of how much territory, if any, that SWAPO controls within
Namibia.
124. Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRaT. Y. B. INT'L L. 249, 250 (1984).
125. Id. at 255. Roberts also demonstrates that in the Fourth Geneva Convention
(the Civilians Convention),
many provisions other than common art. 2 indicate that occupation is conceived
of more broadly than in the Hague Regulations. The most notable of such provi-
sions are art. 6, which refers to occupations which continue after the end of mili-
tary operations, and art. 47, which inter alia takes account of two possibilities;
the first being an occupation in which the authorities of the occupied territory
remain in post, and the second being an attempted annexation by the occupant
of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
Id. at 253.
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have often maintained that international humanitarian law is applica-
ble to particular situations, "irrespective of the issue as to whether
they count as international armed conflicts and/or occupations." '12 6
Within the terms of Article 2(2), the occupation must take place in
"the territory of a High Contracting Party."127 In the absence of a min-
imal declaration by SWAPO, it would be mere legal sophistry to argue
that SWAPO is nevertheless a "High Contracting Party. 128 Critics
might even argue that a formal declaration by SWAPO will still not
transform it into a High Contracting Party. Moreover, the language of
Article 2(2) suggests that it was drafted to operate prospectively, i.e. to
deal with occupations that took place after, and not before, 1949.129
Nevertheless, the third paragraph of Article 2 leaves the Conven-
tion open to non-contracting entities such as Namibia.130 Even if it is
maintained that the Geneva Conventions are open only to State enti-
ties, an argument can be made that Namibia's case is sui generis. The
international community has consistently taken the view that sover-
eignty in Namibia resides in the Namibian people, and not in the
South African government.13 ' In effect, Namibia is viewed as possess-
ing a kind of autonomy and sovereignty that is comparable to state-
hood. The General Assembly has transferred Namibian statehood to
the United Nations Council for Namibia.13 2 The Council and the inter-
national community, in turn, recognize SWAPO as "the true and legiti-
mate representative" of the Namibian people. " Thus, both SWAPO
and the United Nations Council for Namibia have the competence to
undertake official acts on behalf of the Namibian people.'"
126. Id. at 302.
127. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2, para. 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id; see Dugard, supra note 120, at 153-54 ("In order to accede to the Geneva
Conventions all that is required of a belligerent entity is that it have international status,
which liberation movements derive from both international law and collective recogni-
tion by the General Assembly.").
131. See infra notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text.
132. See Report of the UN Council for Namibia (1985), supra note 54, at 1.
133. In 1973, the UN Security Council unanimously declared SWAPO the "authentic
representatives of the people of Namibia." See AFRICA, Oct. 1986, at 29. The General
Assembly and the OAU also recognize SWAPO as the "sole and legitimate representative
of the Namibian people." See Report of the UN Council for Namibia (1985), supra note
54, at 1; cf. recent statement by United States representative, Ms. Byrne, U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 19) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/42iPV.59 (1987) ("We object to the repeated refer-
ences to SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.' ").
134. See I. SAGAY, supra note 13, at 271-83 (arguing that the UN Council for Namibia
has full powers of statehood and is the de jure government of Namibia); cf. I. BROWNLE
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-79 (1979) (arguing that because the UN
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Assuming arguendo that Namibia's sui generis position entitles it
to be regarded as a potential party to the Conventions, it still remains
to be answered whether Namibia, as a power in conflict, "accepts and
applies the provisions" of the Conventions."' As pointed out by Pictet,
"[t]here is no reason to assume that acceptance necessarily implies an
explicit declaration. It can equally well be tacit. It may be implicit in
de facto application."136 SWAPO has stated that "[tihe Namibian
Army must - and does - comply with the laws and customs of war as
set out, in particular, in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and South
Africa's armed forces are bound by these provisions.""3
SWAPO has therefore pledged its intention to comply with the
laws of war in its conflict with South Africa.3 8 It has been argued,
however, that South Africa will require more evidence of SWAPO's in-
tention in this regard than a statement presented to a non-governmen-
tal international conference.'3 This argument is seriously flawed.
SWAPO's formal pledge to a conference organized by distinguished
bodies such as the International Commission of Jurists, the Interna-
has limited international personality, the UN Council for Namibia does not have the
competence to administer the territory).
135. See supra note 6.
136. PICTET COMMENTARY III, supra note 114, at 26; see Draper, The Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 in (I) RECUEIL DES COURs 63, 74 (1965) (arguing that in a case where a
Power in conflict in fact applies the Conventions, but makes no formal declaration of
acceptance, there may be some justification for the view that such compliance ought to
be taken as an implied acceptance of the Conventions).
137. See Dugard, supra note 120, at 152 (quoting Namibia and the International
Rule of Law, submitted by SWAPO to the International Conference on Namibia and
Human Rights, held in Dakar, Senegal, in January 1976 (Dakar Conference, NDH 76,
IV.a., at 12, published by the Int'l Inst. of Human Rights of Strasbourg (1976)).
As discussed below, it is difficult to believe that SWAPO can strictly adhere to the
laws of war in their entirety due to SWAPO's essential nature as a guerrilla group. The
South African government regards SWAPO as a terrorist organization that frequently
violates the laws of war by attacking civilian targets. In February 1988, after a bomb
exploded in a Namibian bank, killing 18 civilians and injuring several others, the South
African government accused and condemned SWAPO for this form of terrorist violence.
See Van Graan & Sapa, SWA Bank Blast: Toll Now 18, The Citizen (Johannesburg),
Feb. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 4. SWAPO's publicity and information spokesmen, however, de-
nied any SWAPO involvement and insisted that "the bomb [was] part of South Africa's
dirty propaganda campaign to smear the name of SWAPO." Id.
In an address to the Security Council, the South African Permanent Representative
at the UN similarly spoke of "SWAPO terrorists moving southward to attack the civilian
population of South West Africa/Namibia." Reprinted in 11 S. APR. Y. B. INT'L L. 234
(1986).
138. SWAPO also took part in the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977 and signed
the Final Act of the Conference. See D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 49 (1981) [hereinafter SCHINDLER & TOMAN].
139. See Dugard, supra note 120, at 156.
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tional Institute of Human Rights, as well as sponsorship by the United
Nations Commissioner for Namibia, should suffice as a formal declara-
tion imposing legal obligations on SWAPO. 4 0 Such declarations "con-
cerning legal or factual situations" may indeed "have the effect of cre-
ating legal obligations" for those on whose behalf they are made. 41
SWAPO's declaration conveyed to the world at large, including South
Africa, its intention to be bound by the Geneva Conventions and Pro-
tocols. The declaration is an official act of SWAPO and, thus, consti-
tutes reliable evidence of SWAPO's intentions.
In addition to acceptance, SWAPO must apply the provisions of
the Convention. Non-compliance by SWAPO could thus give rise to an
international delict. It would mean that individual SWAPO combat-
ants could be subjected to trial and punishment for their illegal acts.
But this should not affect their entitlement to POW status.
c. Third Party Involvement
It can also be argued that the conflict in Namibia derives an inter-
national character from the involvement of neighboring countries such
as Angola. The policy of "hot pursuit" followed by the South African
Defence Force (the "SADF") is such that the South African army al-
most invariably engages the Angolan army in conflict. 4 ' Thus, the
Namibian conflict involves not only South Africa and SWAPO, but
other sovereign States who are parties to the Geneva Conventions.14
140. To make doubly sure, this author suggests that SWAPO should, in addition, file
a formal declaration with the Swiss government.
141. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 573, at
para. 39, reiterating the observation made in the Nuclear Tests cases, 1974 I.C.J. 267,
472.
142. See Legum, supra note 26. The latest incident occurred on Feb. 20, 1988, when
South African Air Force ("SAAF") fighter jets attacked SWAPO bases deep in Angola.
The attacks were reprisals for a bomb blast allegedly carried out by SWAPO in Namibia.
See The Sunday Times (S. Africa), Feb. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 1. In defense of the reprisals,
the South African Defence Minister stated:
Making hot pursuit and pre-emptive strikes against SWAPO bases in Angola has
long been the policy used by the South African Security forces in South-West
Africa, and Saturday's strikes against SWAPO bases in Angola do not, therefore,
represent a new development.
The Citizen, Feb. 22, 1988, at 2, col. 4. That the Namibian conflict involves third-parties
was also manifest in statements made by the Chief of the SADF in December 1983, to
the effect that SWAPO guerrillas had joined forces with Cuban and Angolan troops
against South African forces. And in 1984, the SADF claimed it had killed 324 Cubans,
Angolans and SWAPO members. See REVOLUTIONARY MovEMENrs, supra note 23, at 246.
143. On September 20, 1984, Angola became the 46th country to accede to Protocol I.
It thus became a Party to the Geneva Conventions at the same time. See 8 I.C.R.C. Dis-
SEMINATION, Dec. 1987, at 10.
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In this respect, the Namibian conflict is an "internationalized non-in-
ternational armed conflict." ' ' Even if it is argued that South Africa's
presence in Namibia does not amount to an occupation within the
sense of the Conventions, and that SWAPO is not a High Contracting
Party, the fact remains that South Africa and Angola are both High
Contracting Parties. Under paragraph 3 of Common Article 2, the two
countries are therefore bound by the Conventions in their mutual rela-
tions.145 The fact of third-party involvement internationalizes the con-
flict in Namibia. The rules of international armed conflict should,
therefore, be applicable in the relations of all Parties to the conflict.
2. Article 1(4) of Protocol I
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol P"4 extends the category of in-
ternational armed conflicts discussed under Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions. It categorizes armed conflicts involving national
liberation movements as international armed conflicts."" Article 1(4)
provides:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.
48
This provision engendered so much debate and controversy that it
has been referred to as "[t]he most controversial clause in the Addi-
tional Protocols."'' One of the principal objections to the inclusion of
144. Phrase respectively borrowed from Gasser, Internationalized Non-International
Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 145 (1983-84).
145. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2, para. 3. This
article is not suggesting that South Africa and Angola are in armed conflict. If that were
the case, then South Africa would be free to attack Angolan territory. As discussed
above, Angola's support to SWAPO cannot be equated with an armed attack against
South Africa. Angolan support to SWAPO merely gives the Namibian conflict an inter-
national dimension.
146. See supra note 7.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?, 33 Y B.
WORLD AFF. 265, 266 (1979). On the problems raised by the introduction of this amend-
ment at the Diplomatic Conference, see generally, Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Con-
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Article 1(4) was the fact that terms such as "alien occupation" and
"racist regime" are vague and subject to political interpretation. It is
unlikely that states would accept the labels of "racist," "alien" or "co-
lonial" necessary for invoking the provision. 5 °  The travaux
preparatoires suggest, however, that these terms were used with spe-
cific situations in mind.15 1 A leading authority and member of the
United States delegation to the Diplomatic Conference confirmed that
the references to "colonial domination" and "racist regimes" were di-
rected essentially at Southern Africa - to South Africa, Namibia, (then)
Rhodesia and to the Portuguese colonies.' 52 The records of the Diplo-
matic Conference thus establish that Article 1(4) was meant to apply
specifically to Namibia and other conflict areas.' 5'
ference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 78-84 (1975).
150. Roberts, New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Addi-
tional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 125-26 (1985). But see Cassesse, supra note 119,
at 313, 318-19 (refuting notion that Article 1(4) introduced "subjectivity, uncertainty and
ambiguity," and arguing that the terms "colonial," "racist" and "alien" are objectively
defined. Cassesse felt that the "extreme narrowness of [these] three categories should
dispel any fear that the broad category of 'national liberation movements' might lead to
Art. 1(4) having an excessively wide field of application.").
151. The writer concedes a change in methodology with respect to the question of
treaty interpretation. Whereas the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were earlier construed in
light of their plain language and their object and purpose, reliance is being placed here
on the travaux preparatoires, in construing the Additional Protocols. Both approaches
are perfectly legitimate methods of interpretation, and they are not necessarily incom-
patible with each other. The difference in methodology here is due to the result-oriented
approach taken in construing both treaties.
152. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics?: The 1974 Diplomatic
Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INrr'L L. J. 1, 12 (1975). Those fighting
against "alien occupation" were the Palestinians. See id; accord Kalshoven, Reaffirma-
tion and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-1977, 8 NETH. Y. B. INT'L L. 107, 122
(1977) (Article 1(4) in effect referred to "the Peoples of Palestine and Southern Africa");
see M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 45-
52 (1982) [hereinafter BOTHE, PAETSCH & SOLF].
In the words of Shabtai Rosenne, however, "there is nothing in the language of the
provision or in the travaux preparatoires or in the language of what became Article 96 to
support so narrow a definition." See Rosenne, Participation in the Geneva Conventions
(1864-1949) and the Additional Protocols of 1977, in PICTET COLLECTION, supra note
119, at 803, n.15 and accompanying text. This reasonable interpretation may be because
countries such as Australia declared, in explaining their vote, that they supported Article
1(4) with the understanding that the enumeration of the three categories was not ex-
haustive. See V OFF. RECS., supra note 119, CDDH/SR.22, at 228.
153. According to Roberts, all Article 1(4) does
is to close a tiny technical loophole in common art. 2 of the 1949 Conventions,
by making a little clearer what was already widely accepted - namely, that the
law on occupations is applicable even in situations (like the West Bank and
Gaza) where the occupied territory was not universally viewed as having been
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Another primary objection to Article 1(4) is that the terms used
therein are political and not legal in nature, and that this is an attempt
to politicize international humanitarian law.""4 Critics such as Ribeiro
argue that Article 1(4) lacks precision and is too open-ended. 15 It is
apparent that politics played a major role in negotiations at the Diplo-
matic Conference. This should not be seen to detract from the essence
of the final document. It is a truism that the "rules of any legal system
inevitably reflect the political preferences of the prevailing groups
within that community.""" In the words of the Australian delegation
to the Diplomatic Conference, Article 1(4) simply echoed "the deeply
felt view of the international community that law must take into ac-
count political realities which have developed since 1949."' ' In re-
sponse to the assertion that "no State is ever going to admit it is a
racist regime or exercising alien or colonial domination," s58 it must be
stressed that the problem of auto-interpretation "has long been re-
garded as a conspicuous Achilles heel in international law." 5 No mat-
ter how tightly-drafted any rule is, the problem of auto-interpretation,
in the final analysis, gives a State the latitude to deny the applicability
of the rules when they are not in the State's interest.' e0 States have
occasionally sought to deny the applicability of international law rules
to specific cases, yet this has not prevented the international commu-
nity from taking action.' The Legal Advisor to the directorate of the
part of 'the territory of a High Contracting Party.'
Roberts, supra note 124, at 254.
154. See, e.g., Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON L.
REv. 531, 532 (1985-86); Protocol II Transmittal Letter, supra note 102.
155. See Ribeiro, International Humanitarian Law: Advancing Progressively Back-
wards, 97 S. AFR. L. J. 42, 50 (1980).
156. Bond, Article 1 of Amended Draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
The Coming of Age of the Guerrilla, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 65, 67 (1975).
157. VI OFF. REcs., supra note 119, CDDH/SR.36, at 59.
158. Statement by the Head of the United States' delegation, reprinted in N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1977, at A5, col. 6.
159. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, in A SuPPLEMNrr TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 437, 459 (1981).
160. The serious nature of the problem is manifest in the Afghan government's insis-
tence that there is no civil war in Afghanistan, much less an international war, and that
the revolutionary government of Afghanistan is in control of the entire country. See Re-
port of the Human Rights Committee, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 122, U.N. Doc.
A/40/40 (1985). For reports to the contrary, see generally Report of the Independent
Counsel on International Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan
(Nov. 18, 1987).
161. Although claims have frequently been made seeking to oust UN competence,
both the Security Council and the General Assembly have increasingly resorted to an
ever-less strict interpretation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. To cite a few examples,
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ICRC has concluded that "[iut is always the government of the state
against which a group is opposed which ultimately decides on the char-
acter of the conflict. '162 This statement is not compatible with a basic
principle of international law: A state may not be a judge in its own
cause.
1 6 3
The fact remains, though, that South Africa is not a Party to Pro-
tocol I. It is assumed that South Africa will not sign or ratify the Pro-
tocol."" Thus, South Africa can only be bound by Article 1(4) if and
when that provision attains the status of custom. 65 It is still too early
to predict the extent to which Article 1(4) will evolve into customary
international law. 66 An assessment can be made, however, on the basis
in the Spanish question the claim was that the existence of the Franco regime, even if it
endangered international peace and security, fell essentially within Spain's domestic ju-
risdiction. See 2 U.N. SCOR (34th mtg.) at 176-77 (1946). This claim was rejected by the
Security Council, and the General Assembly actually recommended collective efforts to
effect a change of government. See Relations of Members of the United Nations with
Spain, G.A. Res. 39(1) (1946). Similarly, South Africa's claim that the treatment of one's
nationals was essentially within a State's domestic jurisdiction was denied by the Gen-
eral Assembly. See generally L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 68 (1969) [hereinafter GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS].
162. Gasser, A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REv. 525,
529 (1986).
163. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 279-89 (1953); see also 1 J. SCOTT, ARTS AND DocuMENTS, SECOND INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE 367 (1907) ("It is a universally accepted doctrine that no one
can be a judge in his own cause and all systems of law adopt it.").
164. See Schindler, supra note 114, at 141 (arguing that countries like Israel and
South Africa, against which wars of liberation are fought, will not sign the Protocol);
Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-77, Part 1: Combat-
ants and Civilians, 8 NETH. Y. B. INT'L L. 107, 122 (1977); BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra
note 125, at 52.
165. It could, however, be argued that South Africa would not be bound by Article
1(4) even if it evolved into customary law (but not jus cogens), by virtue of the fact that
South Africa withdrew from the Diplomatic Conference and has vigorously and consist-
ently opposed attempts to declare wars of national liberation as international conflicts.
This argument is consistent with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 1951 I.C.J. 116,
which suggests that a State can be exempted from the binding nature of a customary
rule if it consistently and vigorously protested against the formation of the rule from its
inception. The need for universality of international humanitarian law, however, detracts
from the essence of this argument. The holding in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case in
relation to the Law of the Sea is not analogous to, and should therefore not be equated
with, the formation of custom in the humanitarian law field.
166. Some authors have concluded, however, that Article 1(4) has already generated a
general rule going beyond the conventional bonds instituted by the Protocol. The adop-
tion of Article 1(4) "testified to the formation of a rule binding on all the States partici-
pating in the Conference (irrespective of whether or not they ratify the Protocol), save
for Israel, which consistently rejected the provision." Cassesse, supra note 119, at 322.
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of the article's short history, from its introduction as an amendment at
the Diplomatic Conference, to the present day.
1 7
Opposition to Article 1(4) was very intense and vigorous at the
first session of the Conference in 1974.08 The result of a vote in 1974
was twenty in favor (predominantly African, Asian and Eastern Euro-
pean countries), twenty-one against (mostly Western countries) and
thirteen abstentions (Western and some Latin American and Asian
countries). 6 ' In 1977, however, when a final vote was taken on the
same article, opposition to it had diminished. It received eighty votes
in favor, only one against (Israel) and eleven abstentions (mostly West-
ern countries and Guatemala).7 Some authors suggest that the West-
ern countries simply abstained because no vital interests of theirs were
at stake, because they were unlikely to be involved in wars of national
liberation. 1 The article was also accepted as long as it would be given
a strict construction to apply only to the limited situations originally
contemplated, such as Israel, South Africa and Portugal.
7
1
Whatever reasons they had for abstaining, the fact remains that
some of the countries who voted against it in 1974 voted for it in 1977.
This shift could be due to a realization that the provision was, after all,
in the supreme interest of international humanitarian law.17 3 Subse-
quent practice has indicated that some of the countries that abstained
have changed their position. For example, although Guatemala voted
against Article 1(4), it ratified Protocol I on October 19, 1987.1"
Such a categorical assertion does not seem to accord fully with state practice. But see
discussion below.
167. While a longer period of time is more likely to evidence the uniformity and con-
sistency of a custom, no minimum period of time is required. In an oft-quoted passage,
the International Court of Justice pointed out that the length of time required depends
on the peculiar nature of the subject-matter involved, and that in certain cases only a
very short period of time may be required for the formation of a custom. See North Sea
Continental Shelf (Denmark, Germany v. Norway), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43.
168. On some of the debates that took place, see generally VIII OFF. RECS., supra note
119; see also H. LEVIE, 1 PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS (1979).
169. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 152, at 43.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Lysaght, The Attitude of Western Countries, in THE NEW HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 354 (A. Cassesse ed. 1978).
172. Roberts, supra note 124, at n.97 and accompanying text.
173. Some of those who abstained made it clear in their explanation on the vote that
they thought Article 1(4) safeguarded basic principles of humanitarian law. See, e.g., VI
OFF. REcs., supra note 119, CDDH/SR.36 (statement of Mr. Freeland (U.K.)), at 47. The
Canadian delegation also stated that although it had abstained on the article as a whole,
it "would have preferred to see the article adopted by consensus." It therefore "hoped
the situations intended to be covered by paragraph 4 would indeed be covered." See id.
at 49 (statement of Mr. Miller).
174. See INT'L RED CROSS BULLETIN, Nov. 1987. Discussions at the Conference also
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On the basis of the evidence so far presented, it may be predicted
that Article 1(4) will increasingly be invoked in the international arena.
In this respect, we can view customary law as being created not only by
the flow of international agreements, international and domestic tribu-
nals, national constitutions, etc., but also by "all kinds of communica-
tions, even from individual human beings who have no explicit authori-
tative role."17 5 Claims have already been made concerning its
applicability to ongoing conflicts. A well-known critic has stated:
Article 1(4), however, has a legal scope too. It is not confined
[to struggles between the PLO and Israel, and between
SWAPO and South Africa]; it can apply to other fresh situa-
tions as well, witness the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
which no doubt comes within the purview of the rule although
the USSR has not ratified the Protocol and will probably re-
frain from doing so in the near future, as well as the Indone-
sian occupation of East Timor. To all these situations both Ar-
ticle 1(4) and the general principles on warfare which this
article renders operative, can be deemed applicable.' 6
The recognition of such conventional rules as customary law will
have the psychological effect of inducing more States to become parties
to the treaty. Several States are in fact preparing to ratify Protocol I,
or are seriously considering doing so.'77 Nevertheless, it can be con-
cluded that Article 1(4) of Protocol I has not definitively passed into
the corpus of customary international law. In light of non-ratification
by South Africa, it will therefore be difficult to argue that the
Namibian conflict is directly governed by that article.
3. Other International Prescriptions
A perusal of international opinion suggests that the Namibian con-
flict is an international armed conflict subject to the appropriate rules
of humanitarian law. The United Nations General Assembly has con-
sistently called for the application of the Geneva Conventions to armed
suggested that "the few States which voiced misgivings about the rule were not moti-
vated by strong opposition to it, but rather considered that the rule was bad law," al-
though it "represented a new law of the international community." Cassesse, supra note
119, at 321.
175. McDougal, Reflections on Order, Freedom, Justice and Power: The Challenges
for International Law, 75 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 186, 199 (1981).
176. A. CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 279 (1986); see also Reis-
man, supra note 86, at 908 (arguing that the resistance in Afghanistan is engaged in an
international conflict coming under Article 1(4) of Protocol I).
177. Gasser, supra note 102, at 924.
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conflicts involving national liberation movements, thus implicitly char-
acterizing them as international conflicts. In 1970, for example, it re-
ferred expressis verbis to the Namibian conflict by calling on South
Africa
to treat the Namibian people captured during their struggle for
freedom as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of
12 August 1949 and to comply with the Geneva Convention rel-
ative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
178
At its 28th session, the General Assembly proclaimed that these strug-
gles were to be regarded as armed conflicts in the sense of the Geneva
Conventions:
The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are to be re-
garded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the legal status envisaged to apply to
the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other in-
ternational instruments are to apply to the persons engaged in
armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes.'17
The international nature of the Namibian conflict is also discussed
in the writings of eminent jurists. In a study on the conflict, Dugard
concluded:
[I]t is difficult to categorize the hostilities inside and on the
borders of South-West Africa as an ordinary internal conflict
which South Africa can treat as a purely internal uprising. The
international status of South-West Africa, coupled with the
findings of the International Court of Justice and the Security
Council that South Africa is in illegal occupation of South-
West Africa, gives the conflict an international character which
has been absent in other colonial conflicts.180
According to Reisman, "[p]eoples engaged in resisting the suppres-
sion of their right to self-determination are fighting what has come to
be known as a 'war of national liberation.' Under the theory of such
178. G. A. Res. 2678, U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 90, U. N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
179. G. A. Res. 2678, U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 142, U. N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
180. Dugard, supra note 120, at 155-56.
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wars, they are international conflicts." 181 The jus ad bellum establishes
the international nature of the Namibian conflict. This conclusion im-
plies that the applicable jus in bello is that pertaining to international,
not internal, armed conflicts.
4. Legal and Policy Implications
Some authors argue that national liberation movements such as
SWAPO cannot fulfill their obligations under the Conventions.8 2 They
contend that this lack of practical reciprocity will destroy one of the
important forces that exist for compliance with the law of armed con-
flict. s This argument is not tenable. The legal effect of SWAPO's dec-
laration of intent' 84 is to subject both SWAPO and South Africa to the
same rights and obligations. They are both under an obligation to ob-
serve the laws of armed conflict in their entirety. While there exists a
fundamental inequality in the legal status of SWAPO and South Af-
rica, this inequality does not presuppose a lack of reciprocity. Nor does
it suggest that a sovereign state is more likely to be humanitarian in its
use of force in suppressing opposition than the group that is resisting
such suppression. Indeed, reports prepared by various human rights
groups have almost invariably indicated that the government in power
violates the laws of war with greater frequency and intensity than does
the group opposing it.' 85 There is no convincing evidence to indicate
181. Reisman, supra note 86, at 908.
182. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 152, at 16.
183. Id; see Ribeiro, supra note 155, at 51.
184. Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 96(3). This requisite condition is even more strin-
gent under Article 96(3) of Protocol I, which states:
The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting
Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may
undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict
by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary. Such declara-
tion shall, upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that conflict the
following effects:
a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said
authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect;
b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those
which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conven-
tions and this Protocol; and
c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to
the conflict.
Id.
185. Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 160. But see HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 1986 (America's Watch Report, Feb. 1987) (concluding that al-
though "the government of Nicaragua does not engage in systematic violations of the
laws of war in the course of military operations," the contras "engage in selective but
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that national liberation movements such as SWAPO will refuse to ob-
serve the laws of war. Members of the liberation movements stated at
the Diplomatic Conference that they could and would observe the laws
of war, and the disparities in resources of the parties involved would
not prevent the liberation groups from respecting the principles of hu-
manitarian law.186
Characterization of the Namibian conflict as an international one
precludes South Africa's competence to classify captured SWAPO
guerrillas as "dissidents" or "criminals" punishable (under South Afri-
can municipal law in Namibia) for taking up arms against the govern-
ment. SWAPO guerrillas are entitled to POW status and treatment
upon capture. 7 The South African courts, however, have held other-
wise. The locus classicus of the general attitude of the South African
courts can be found in S v. Sagarius En Andere.88 The three accused
were part of a group of twenty-two SWAPO guerrillas who had been
captured by the South African Defence Force when they entered
Namibia from Angola. 8 9 Although the accused were all clad in clearly
distinctive SWAPO uniforms, and despite its recognition that the ac-
systematic killing .... indiscriminate attacks against civilians or in disregard for their
safety, and in outrages against the personal dignity of prisoners."). Id. at 6.
186. See, e.g. VIII OFF. REcs., supra note 119, CDDH/I/SR.4 (statement of Mr.
Monteiro (FRELIMO)), at 32. Mr. Armaly (PLO) has stated:
The argument that national liberation movements would be incapable of carry-
ing out certain humanitarian obligations was not borne out by the facts. For
instance, in the struggle the Palestinian people were waging against Israel, such
international bodies as the ICRC, Amnesty International and even the Israeli
League for Civil and Human Rights, had testified that Israel had committed
many violations of humanitarian law, whereas the Palestinian resistance had al-
ways collaborated with the ICRC, in accordance with the Geneva Convention,
and inter alia, had returned Israeli prisoners of war through the ICRC.
VIII OFF. REcs., supra note 119, CDDH/I/SR.5 at 38. In the first formal declaration ever
made by a liberation movement to the ICRC, African National Congress ("ANC") Presi-
dent Oliver Tambo stated:
We undertake to treat members of the regular armed forces of the South African
regime, captured by Umkhonto we Sizwe, as prisoners of war. We undertake to
be bound by the other relevant provisions of the Conventions. In consequence,
we demand that the South African regime make a similar commitment in accor-
dance with the present day rule of war to treat the combatants of Umkhonto we
Sizwe as protected combatants.
AFRICA Now, Jan. 1987, at 7. It remains to be seen the extent to which the ANC will
adhere to the Conventions and Protocols.
187. See generally Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion (III)].
188. 1983 (1) S.A.L.R. 833.
189. Id.
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cused had been captured in a "war situation," the court held that the
SWAPO guerrillas could not be regarded as POWs."s' In imposing a
sentence on the SWAPO guerrillas, however, the court accepted the
public international law aspects of the case as being relevant to the
mitigating factors involved in sentencing." 1 Among the factors it took
into consideration were the following:
1. That the International Court of Justice and other United
Nations Organs and international actors had branded the
South African presence in Namibia as illegal;"'
2. That the SWAPO guerrillas regarded their actions as part
of a just conflict with strong local and foreign support;"93
3. That there is a tendency in general international law to ac-
cord POW status to captives that openly participate in a
characteristic uniform in an armed conflict against a racist,
colonial or foreign regime;"94
4. That although the South African legislation had qualified
the offenses as serious misconduct, this conflicted with the
view of a major part of the community in Namibia , as well
as of the international community, according to the undis-
puted evidence given in court;" 5 and
5. That heavy penalties would not discourage other SWAPO
activists from carrying out their operations, so particularly
heavy sentences would not serve as a deterrent."'
In essence, while the court was denying POW status to the
SWAPO combatants, it was admitting that, consistent with present
trends in international law, SWAPO combatants should be entitled to
POW status upon capture." 7 Cases such as S v. Sagarius En Andere
190. Id. at 833(G).
191. Id. at 834.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 833(H).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 837(D).
196. Id. at 838(A).
197. But cf. S v. Mogoerane et. al. (not reported in South African Law Reports),
discussed in Murray, The 1977 Geneva Protocols and Conflict in Southern Africa, 33
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 462 (1984), in which three accused ANC members, found to have
been involved in attacks on three South African police stations, were denied POW status
and sentenced to death, in spite of appeals from the international community for mitiga-
tion of the sentence. It would appear, however, that the court in Mogoerane did not
consider the international law aspects of the case as being of relevance in the context of
mitigating factors, because the ANC members involved had failed to distinguish them-
selves from ordinary civilians while carrying out the attacks.
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are normally decided on the basis of South Africa's Domestic Terror-
ism Act of 1967.1" The Terrorism Act is at variance with South Af-
rica's obligations under the Third Geneva Convention, to which South
Africa is a signatory. 199 In justification of the courts' attitudes, several
authors argue that although South Africa acceded to the Conventions
in 1952, they have not yet been incorporated into South Africa's do-
mestic law.200 They also argue that, in any event, the South African
government cannot fetter its executive action by international law obli-
gations, because "the security of the [South African] State is suprema
lex. ' '"2 0 It is a settled principle of international, however, law that a
State may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty obligation.02 In addition, South Af-
rica's own internal law contains a rule of construction that the South
African legislature is presumed not to intend to infringe upon South
Africa's international obligations.0" The South African courts must
therefore construe South Africa's municipal law in Namibia in such a
way as to avoid conflict with South Africa's obligations under the Ge-
neva Conventions.
SWAPO, on the other hand, has corresponding obligations. Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention provides:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:
1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps form-
ing part of such armed forces.
2) Members of other militias and members of other volun-
teer corps, including those of organized resistance move-
ments, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil
the following conditions:
a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
198. Comment, Considerations of International Humanitarian Law In Sentencing
Members of SWAPO- S v. Sagarius, 9 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 112 (1983).
199. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 187.
200. See, e.g., Dugard, supra note 120, at 152.
201. Booysen, Treaties, Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War in South African Law,
90 S. AFR. L. J. 386, 391 (1973).
202. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 27.
203. Erasmus, Mandates, Military Service and Multiple Choice, 11 S. AFR. Y. B.
INT'L L. 114, 128 (1985-86).
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his subordinates;
b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance;
c) that of carrying arms openly;
d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.'"4
SWAPO will have to satisfy each of the requisite criteria outlined
above. The internal, as well as the external wings of SWAPO may
qualify under either "members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict," or "other militias and members of other volunteer corps...
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their
own territory.""2 5 SWAPO's international recognition as the "sole and
legitimate representative of the Namibian people" 0 6 should suffice to
establish that it belongs to a Party to the Namibian conflict.0 7
SWAPO will also have to meet other minimal requirements. The
need for organization, for example, is a very important criterion in as-
certaining whether SWAPO forces are entitled to POW status upon
capture.2"' This requirement exists because there is the need to distin-
guish irregulars fighting on their own or fighting a private war, from
those operating under the supervision or orders of SWAPO. This
makes it easier to attribute responsibility when there is a breach of the
laws of war. 09 The requirement of organization should pose no prob-
204. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 187, art. 4.
205. Id. art. 4(A)(1) & (2). In wars of national liberation, a Party to a conflict is
comprised of people represented by the liberation movement. Abi-Saab, Wars of Na-
tional Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 165 (IV) RECUEIL DES
COURs 353, 419 (1979).
206. See supra note 133.
207. This accords with Pictet's commentary on the provision:
It is essential that there should be a de facto relationship between the resistance
organization and the Party to international law which is in a state of war, but
the existence of this relationship is sufficient. It may find expression merely by
tacit agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side
the resistance organization is fighting.
PICTET COMMENTARY III, supra note 114, at 57.
208. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 5 JUNE 1977 To THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AuGuST 1949 (1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]:
The term "organized" is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of
degrees of organization. In the first place, this should be interpreted in the sense
that the fighting be collective in character, be conducted under proper control
and according to rules, as opposed to individuals operating in isolation with no
corresponding preparation or training.
Id. at 512.
209. Under Article 44 of Protocol I, however, an irregular who takes part in hostili-
ties, although detached from the parent group (in this case, SWAPO) and not within its
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lem to SWAPO, because it is met by the most rudimentary elements of
a military organization.2 "0
In order for SWAPO forces to be accorded POW status by the
South African government, they must be "commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates." ''1 Having a person responsible for his
subordinates provides a reasonable assurance of adherence by irregular
forces to the fundamental requirement of compliance with the laws of
war. This requirement might, however, be problematic for SWAPO.
Full details about the identity of military leaders and the command
structure of resistance groups such as SWAPO are hardly ever re-
vealed. For security reasons, this information is often a closely guarded
secret, unknown even to most of the fighters.2 12 It was due to these
realities that Protocol I changed the requirement to that of a collegial
command, in lieu of an individual commander.212 In light of the conclu-
sion that Protocol I is not directly applicable to the Namibian conflict,
however, SWAPO will have to satisfy the Third Geneva Convention's
requirement of being "commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates."
1 4
Above all, SWAPO will be entitled to POW status only if its com-
batants "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war."21' SWAPO forces generally resort to guerrilla warfare in
the conduct of the war in Namibia. But the concept of guerrilla war-
fare, by definition, is at variance with the laws of armed conflict.21 6
Guerrilla warfare normally forces a status of quasi-belligerency on the
civilian populace of the territory in which the conflict is taking place. It
easily blurs the distinction between combatant and non-combatant.2 7
control, may be entitled to claim POW status. See Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 44.
210. Mallison & Mallison, supra note 120, at 50.
211. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 187, art. 4(A)2.
212. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed, Report of the Secretary-General, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at para. 176, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970) [hereinafter Report of
the Secretary-General].
213. See Protocol I, supra note 7. SWAPO forces must be "under a command respon-
sible to (the Namibian People) for the conduct of its subordinates, even if (the Namibian
People) are represented by a government or an authority [i.e., SWAPO] not recognized
by an adverse Party." Id. On the reasons for this significant change from the rule in
Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention (III), see BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 152,
at 237.
214. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 187, art. 4(A)(2)(a).
215. Id. art. 4(A)(2)(d).
216. Baxter, So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,
28 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 323, 327-28 (1951) ("It is reasonable to suppose that guerrillas and
members of resistance movements will more frequently than not fail to conform to the
[laws of war], since secrecy and surprise are the essence of such warfare.").
217. The distinction drawn between combatants and non-combatants is certainly one
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It is therefore imperative that SWAPO refrain from adopting tactics
which help to blur that distinction, because failure by SWAPO com-
batants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of
Namibia will expose the people on whose behalf SWAPO is fighting to
greater risk.
Article 4(A)(2)(d) of the Third Geneva Convention refers to the
respect of the laws and customs of war by SWAPO as a whole."' This
qualification implies that if the majority of SWAPO guerrillas fail, at
any time, to comply with the laws of war, no individual member of
SWAPO will be entitled to POW status, even if the individual did not
violate the laws of war. This result might discourage individual
SWAPO guerrillas from strictly adhering to the laws and customs of
war, especially if SWAPO as a whole indulges in practices inconsistent
with the applicable laws. The question of the treatment of individual
SWAPO guerrillas who faithfully adhere to the laws of war is therefore
a problem deserving special consideration. Conversely, an individual
SWAPO member who violates the laws of war, contrary to SWAPO's
orders, will nevertheless remain entitled to combatant and POW status
upon capture. He will, however, be liable to be tried as a POW, for war
crimes.2" This provision should have the salutary effect of providing
SWAPO guerrillas with an incentive to comply with the laws of war.
V. APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION
In ascertaining the applicable laws of armed conflict in any situa-
tion, the inquiry should focus on the nature of the human rights being
threatened, rather than on the nature of the conflict. This is because
international humanitarian law is people-oriented, and is mainly con-
cerned with protecting individuals from the horrors of war. Thus, in a
conflict situation where the loss of lives and deprivation of basic
human rights is at stake, a more stringent set of rules should be used
to regulate the conduct of the conflict. A perusal of the Namibian con-
flict indicates that it is precisely the kind of conflict situation which
needs maximum international regulation.22 ° It presents a classic exam-
of the most fundamental principles of international law. It has been characterized as
"the greatest triumph of international law." See J. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37
(1911); see also Nurick, The Distinction between Combatant and Non-Combatant in
the Law of War, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 680 (1945); Trainin, Question of Guerrilla Warfare in
the Law of War, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 534 (1946).
218. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 212, at para. 179.
219. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 173, 204 (1971).
220. See Dugard, supra note 120, at 155. Dugard argues that "(a]lthough it is impos-
sible to extend the Geneva Conventions in their present form fully to wars of liberation,
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pie of the potential risks of wider regional conflicts growing out of low-
intensity conflicts.
As argued above, the factual situation in the Namibian conflict
makes it an international conflict according to the provisions of Com-
mon Article 2 of the Conventions.22" ' Thus, it is imperative that all par-
ties to the conflict conduct the war according to the rules which apply
to international armed conflicts. This position is not only dictated by
the present state of international law, but is also consistent with the
self-interest of the parties to the conflict. SWAPO will be more likely
to observe the rules of warfare when it knows it will receive reciprocal
treatment from the South African army. By applying Common Article
2 of the Geneva Conventions, the soldiers and civilians on both sides
will be accorded a greater degree of protection than would be the case
if only Common Article 3 were deemed applicable.22 2 If, for any of the
reasons discussed above, SWAPO is unable to care for captured South
African soldiers in its custody, the prisoners must be released or
handed over to a neutral Party for exchange. Such benevolence can
only gain support for SWAPO's cause. Similarly, South Africa must
treat captured SWAPO guerrillas as POWs. Those that are found to
have violated the laws of war can rightly be tried as war criminals,
rather than treated as criminals under the domestic penal system.
The conflict in Namibia, and, consequently, Southern Africa, is
wreaking incalculable havoc on the economies in the region,22 and un-
doubtedly poses one of the greatest threats to global conflict today. It
is probably accurate to say there exists no political issue in the world
today that enjoys such unanimity as the decolonization of Namibia.
The process of decolonization in world social process would not have
taken place without the threat or use of force. A resort to force in pur-
suit of the fundamental human rights of the Namibian people is there-
fore justified in contemporary international law. Similarly, SWAPO
and the people of Namibia are entitled to international assistance from
the international community cannot afford to leave wars of national liberation without
any legal regulation except the elementary safeguards referred to in Common Article 3 of
the Conventions." Id.
221. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2.
222. It does appear, however, that in addition to Common Article 2, Common Article
3 still provides for the minimal conduct expected of the parties. See id. common arts. 2
& 3.
223. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1986, South Africa's acts of aggression
cost the nine countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
(the "SADCC") more than 18 billion United States dollars. See Report of the Special
Committee Against Apartheid, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/42/22
(1987); and in the last decade alone, Namibia's economy has fallen to less than half its
output. See AFRICA, Sep. 1986, at 34.
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the world community in their armed struggle against a situation that
can be characterized as an illegal occupation par excellence.
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A growing realization in the world community of the international
dimensions of the Namibian conflict and the strong jus ad bellum
claims supporting SWAPO's cause should serve as an incentive for
third-party states to assist the struggle of the Namibian people politi-
cally and materially. A legal analysis of the conflict indicates that con-
tinued South African occupation of Namibia is not justified. In this
respect, it is hoped that international elites will play an effective and
meaningful role in the ongoing attempts to bring an end to the
Namibian conflict and to South African occupation of the territory.
224. The International Court of Justice recognized that "all States can be held to
have a legal interest in the protection" of basic human rights, and that such rights are
"obligations erga omnes." See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3-4, para. 33.
Indeed, there is a growing trend in state practice as well as a burgeoning jurispru-
dential literature in support of the proposition that the prohibition against massive
human rights deprivations is a rule of jus cogens. There has also developed in the prac-
tice of states the doctrine of "humanitarian intervention", i.e., "the proportionate trans-
boundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in an-
other state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government." F. TESON, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1988). The Congo crisis of
1964, the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979
are ample evidence of the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, provided it meets
certain requisite conditions.
For positions defending the legality of humanitarian intervention, see generally A.
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 223 (1987); Lillich, Humanitarian
Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (J. Moore ed. 1974); Reisman, Humanita-
rian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 167 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law:
Grenada, The Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L. J. 621
(1986); see also Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 586 ("Some authors have suggested that
when a particular ideology or political system is so extreme in that it grossly violates
human rights, it should not be protected by prohibitions against force."). Cf. N.
RONzirrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS O HUMANITY 89
(1985); Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 357 (1985); Farer, The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict,
142 RECUEIL DES COURS 291 (1974); Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Inva-
sion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649 (1984).
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